Why Might a Country Want to Develop its Comparative Disadvantage Industries? by Wenli Cheng & Dingsheng Zhang
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
ISSN 1441-5429 
DISCUSSION PAPER 15/05 
WHY MIGHT A COUNTRY WANT TO DEVELOP ITS COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGE 
INDUSTRIES? A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS  
Wenli Cheng and Dingsheng Zhang 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a general equilibrium 2x2 Ricardian model that demonstrates the possibility of 
immiserizing growth as a result of a productivity improvement in a country’s export industry.  The 
model also shows that immiserizing growth can be avoided by improving the productivity of the 
country’s comparative disadvantage industry.  However this strategy may inflict harm on its trading 
partner.  In comparison, a balanced growth strategy can improve welfare of the growing country 
without hurting its trading partner.    
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Standard theory of international trade predicts that if each country specialises (partially or 
completely) according to its comparative advantage, and trades with one another, all will gain from 
trade.  One might be tempted to infer from this result that a country should focus on developing the 
industries that it has a natural comparative advantage in.  However, this inference is not 
necessarily correct partly because productivity progress in a country’s export industry (which the 
country has a comparative advantage in) can cause the country’s terms of trade to deteriorate, 
which may lead to a net reduction of the country’s welfare.  This possibility is referred to in the 
literature as “immiserizing growth”. 
 
According to Melvin (1969), the possibility of “immiserizing growth” was probably first discovered 
by Edgeworth (1894) who referred to it as economic damnification.  Bhagwati (1958) coined the 
term “immiserizing growth” and provided a modern treatment of this phenomenon in a series of 
papers (Bhagwati, 1958, 1968, 1969).  Other early analyses of immiserizing growth include 
Johnson (1967) and Melvin (1969).  More recently, Samuelson (2004) provided an example of 
immiserizing growth where an invention can reduce the welfare of the inventor if the industry that 
the invention affects faces an inelastic demand. 
 
Knowing the possibility of immiserizing growth, how can a country avoid it?   Bhagwati (1968) 
contends that there are two generic types of immiserizing growth, one is caused by a welfare-
reducing distortion in the economy (such as monopoly power), and the other is not.  The first type 
of immiserizing growth can be avoided by introducing optimal (from the growing country’s 
perspective) policy interventions such as imposing an optimal tariff to eliminate the welfare 
reducing effects of the distortion.  However Bhagwati (1968) does not offer strategies for avoiding 
immiserizing growth of the second type where no distortion is involved.  Indeed to our knowledge 
nobody has – the focus of the literature appears to have been on showing that immiserizing growth 
can occur without giving too much thought to how it can be avoided.  
 
This paper follows Samuelson (2004) to model immiserizing growth in a general equilibrium 
Ricardian model with a CES utility function.  However our model considers all possible trade 
structures and explicitly defines the conditions under which immiserizing growth can occur in 
equilibrium.  In addition, our model shows that the growing country can avoid immiserizing growth 
and increase welfare by improving the productivity of its comparative disadvantage (i.e., import 
  2substituting) industry.  This result suggests that for developing countries that mainly export goods 
with low demand elasticity (e.g., agricultural products), it may be important that they develop their 
capacities in their comparative disadvantage industries in order to obtain more gains from trade.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents the model.  Section 3 
demonstrates the possibility of immiserizing growth, and section 4 considers possible strategies to 
avoid it.   The concluding section discusses the limitations of the model and possible areas of 
further research. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
Consider a world economy with two countries, country 1 and country 2, each endowed with a 
workforce Li (i =1, 2) which can be used to produce two consumer goods X and Y.   We assume 
that the consumer goods can be freely traded between the countries, but labour is not mobile 
across countries.  
 
2.1. Consumer decision 
Following Samuelson (2004), we assume that the representative consumer maximizes utility that 
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where  xi and yi are quantities of goods X and Y, respectively;   is the price of good X,  is the 
price of good Y which is set to be 1; and 
x p y p
wi is the wage rate in country i.  
 
Solving the consumer’s decision problem, we obtain the following demand functions for goods X 
and Y 
,
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2.2. Firm decision 
We assume that the production functions for X and Y in country i are:  
ix ix i L a x = ,                                     (3)  iy iy i L a y =
  3where  , ix iy L L   are labor devoted to the production of good X and Y,  respectively; 
is the labor productivity coefficient.  Since a  is country specific, it captures 
productivity differences between the two countries.   
(1 , 2 ; , ) ij ai j x y == ij
 
Constrained by the production technology, the representative firm producing X in country i 
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The Lagrangian function for the above optimisation problem is  
ix ix ix i ix ix x ix L L w L a p λ + − = Ζ  
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
0 = + − =
∂
Ζ ∂
ix i ix x
ix
ix w a p
L
λ                                                      (4) 
0 , 0 , 0 = ≥ ≥ ix ix ix ix L L λ λ                                                    (5) 
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Define a Lagrangian function for above optimisation problem as  
iy iy iy i iy iy y iy L L w L a p λ + − = Ζ  
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
0 = + − =
∂
Ζ ∂
iy i iy y
iy
iy w a p
L
λ                                                  (6) 
0 , 0 , 0 = ≥ ≥ iy iy iy iy L L λ λ                                                    (7) 
Since Lix, Liy can be positive or zero, there are 32 (=24) possible production structures.  However, 
only 7 of these production structures are feasible if the two countries stay in autarky or trade with 
each other.  The 7 feasible production structures are listed in Table 1.  As shown in Table 1, the 
feasible structures consist (1) 1 structure where both countries produce both goods; (2) 4 
structures where 1 country produces one good, and the other produces two goods; (3) 2 structures 
where each country produces 1 good.   
 




Characters of Economic Structures  Structures 
1  1122 0, 0, 0, 0 xyxy LLLL >>>>   (XY)(XY) 
2  11 22 0, 0 0, 0 xy xy LL LL >> >=   (XY)(X) 
3  1122 0, 0, 0, 0 xyxy LLLL >>=>   (XY)(Y) 
4  1122 0, 0, 0, 0 xyxy LLLL >=>>   (X)(XY) 
5  1122 0, 0, 0, 0 xyxy LLLL =>>>   (Y)(XY) 
6  1122 0, 0, 0, 0 xyxy LLLL >==>   (X)(Y) 
7  11 22 0, 0 0, 0 xy xy LL LL => >=   (Y)(X) 
 
 
2.3. Market clearing conditions 
In equilibrium, consumers’ utility and firms’ profit are maximised, and the markets for goods and for 
labor clear.  The market clearing conditions include the following: 
      
s s d d x x x x 2 1 2 1 + = +          ( 8 )  
 
s s d d y y y y 2 1 2 1 + = +          ( 9 )  
 
11 xy 1 L LL +=           ( 1 0 )  
 
22 xy 2 L LL +=           ( 1 1 )  
 
It should be noted that, according to Walras’ law, only three of the above four equations are 
independent. 
 
2.4. General equilibrium structures 
Solving the consumer’s and firms’ decision problems, and applying the market clearing conditions, 
we can obtain the equilibrium prices and utility levels.  Moreover, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 
  5the firms’ decision problems and the market clearing conditions also define the conditions under 
which a specific structure emerges in equilibrium.   
 
To illustrate, consider structure (X)X(XY)Y.   As is clear from Table 1, this structure 
requires .  From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions which are equations (4)-
(7), we obtain the equilibrium relative price and wage rates 
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Equation (13) implies   








 which defines one condition under which structure  (X)X(XY)Y emerges in equilibrium.   
 
In addition, using market clear conditions (8)-(11), we have 
  
11 22
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From equation (14) and the condition , we get another condition for this structure to emerge 
in equilibrium, which is 
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  6Under these conditions, the equilibrium utility levels for an individual in each country (which we 
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Similarly we can solve the equilibrium prices, wages for other structures.  The solutions are 
presented in Table 2.  
 
Following a similar approach as illustrated above, we can also define the conditions under which a 
specific structure emerges in equilibrium.   It can be shown that structure (XY)(XY) occurs in 
equilibrium only when  11 (/) x y aa= 22 (/) x y aa, that is, no comparative advantage exists.  This is a 
very special case which we do not focus on in this paper.  The remaining 6 structures fall into two 
symmetric categories with 3 structures emerging  
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  7if  11 (/) x y aa> 22 (/) x y aa, and the other 3 emerging if  11 (/) x y aa< 22 (/) x y aa.  Because the equilibrium 
structures, corresponding conditions for existence of general equilibrium, and the equilibrium utility 
levels are symmetric, we only present the results assuming  11 (/) x y aa> 22 (/) x y aa, which means 




Table 3:  General equilibrium conditions, structures and per capita real income  














































































































































In Table 3, the subscripts denote the good exported.  For example, (XY)X(Y)Y means that country 1 
produce goods X and Y and exports good X, and country 2 produces good Y and exports good Y.  
 
    
3.  THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMISERIZING GROWTH  
From Table 3, we obtain the comparative statics of general equilibrium per capita real income with 
respect to country 2’s productivity in good X ( 2x a ) and good Y( 2y a ).  The results are presented in 






  8Table 4: Comparative statics of equilibrium per capita real income 

































































































































y .  In other 
words, there exists the possibility of immiserizing growth.  For instance, if we adopt the same initial 
parameter values as assumed in Samuelson (2004), namely,   
Population parameters: ,  .   1 100 L = 2 1000 L =








xy aa = = .   







> , and 
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, the equilibrium trade 
structure is  (X)X(Y)Y.   From Table 4, we can calculate real per capital income for country 1 and 
country 2, which are 1 and 0.1, respectively.  Now suppose country 2’s productivity in good Y 
improves from  2
2
10
y a =  to
10
3
' 2 = y a , while other parameters remain the same.  Following the 
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the equilibrium structure is still (X)X(Y)Y.  The new equilibrium per capita real income levels 
become 1.44 and 0.096 for country 1 and country 2 respectively.   In this example, a 50% 
  9productivity growth in its export good Y has led country 2’s per capita income to fall by 4% from 0.1 
to 0.096. 
 
If country 2’s productivity growth in good Y is so large that the equilibrium structure moves away 
from structure (X)X(Y)Y, country 2 may still suffer from immiserizing growth.  For instance, in the 
above example, suppose country 2’ productivity in good Y improves from  2
2
10
y a =  to  2
8
10
y a′ = , 









≥ , the 
equilibrium trade structure will be structure (X)X(XY)Y, and the per capital real income for country 1 
and country 2 will become 2.56 and 0.064, respectively.  In other words, following a four-fold 
increase in productivity of its export good, country 2’s per capita real income has fallen 36% from 
0.1 to 0.064.   This is the same result as in Samuelson (2004).
*
 
To illustrate how changes in country 2’s productivity in the Y industry affect the two countries’ per 
capita real income, we specify values of other parameters as follows: 




xy aa == ,  2
1
20
x a = .  
Given these parameters, we can express the equilibrium per capita real income in the two 
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* Samuelson (2004) does not develop a model that allows different structures, but his example implies a 
change of trading structure as a result of productivity improvement. 
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The per capita real income levels in country 1 and country 2 are depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 2, 
respectively.  
 




























From Figure 1, it is clear that any increase in a2y beyond the level  2y a  =1/10 will benefit country 1.   
From Figure 2, we can see that country 2’s per capita real income is maximised at  2y a =2/10.  
Further improvement in a2y alone will lead to immiserizing growth; and even when immiserizing 
  11growth stops if  2y a >8/10, continuing improvement in  2y a  alone can at best lead country 2’s per 
capita real income back to the maximum level achieved at  2y a =2/10. 
 
Why would country 2 suffer from its own productivity improvement?  The traditional explanation is 
that because the demand for country 2’s export good Y is inelastic, an improvement in productivity 
in Y lowers country 2’s terms of trade (the price of Y relative to X), which causes a loss that 
outweighs the productivity gain.  While the statement is intuitively appealing, it does not shed light 
on the conditions under which the loss from terms of trade deterioration may be outweighed by the 
productivity gain.  
Clearly a fall in a country’s terms of trade does not necessarily lead to a fall in the country’s real 
income.  For instance, in our model, given structure (X)X(XY)Y, a increase in  2y a  will worsen 
country 2’s terms of trade (1/ x p ) as  0 / ) / 1 ( 2 < ∂ ∂ y x a p , but will increase country 2’s per capita 
income as  .  Therefore to determine the impact of productivity on real income, we 
need to know more than how the terms of trade have changed.  Indeed, in a general equilibrium 
model such as ours, the terms of trade and income levels are simultaneously determined, thus we 
can and should examine directly how productivity growth affects both countries’ income levels from 
the equilibrium utility functions instead of indirectly through the terms of trade effect.   
0 / 2 2 > ∂ ∂ y a u
 






y .  
Combining this condition with the condition under which structure (X)X(Y)Y occurs in equilibrium, 
2










, we can define the conditions for immiserizing growth to occur in our 
model, which is:  
2
11 22 11 2
2
22 1 2 2
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>>             ( 1 7 )  
 
4. HOW TO AVOID IMMISERIZING GROWTH? 
Since immiserizing growth can occur in our model only if condition (17) is satisfied, logically if 
country 2 can change the parameters in its control so that the parameter values do not satisfy 
condition (17), immiserizing growth will be avoided.  For simplicity we assume that all the 
parameters related to country 1 and population in country 2 ( ) are fixed, so that country 2 can 
only change the two productivity parameters 
2 L
2x a  and  2y a .    Condition (17) suggests that an 
  12increase in  2x a  will make the first inequality of condition (17) less likely to be satisfied, and have no 
impact on the second inequality.   In comparison, an increase in  2y a  will make the first inequality of 
condition (17) less likely to be satisfied, and make the second inequality more likely to be satisfied.   
This suggests that a strategy for country 2 to avoid immiserizing productivity growth in its export 
industry is to improve productivity of its import substituting or comparative disadvantage industry 
(i.e., to increase 2x a ). 
 
To illustrate how changes in  2x a  affect both countries’ per capita real income levels, we 
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10
y a = .  Given these parameters, we can rewrite the 



















































The per capita real income levels in both countries are depicted in Figure 3.  
 












  13It is clear from Figure 3 that, before  2x a  reaches 0.2, there is no impact on either country’s per 
capita real income (because X is not produced in country 2).  If  2x a  increases beyond 0.2 where 
other parameters remain unchanged, country 2’s per capita real income will increase, whereas 
country 1’s will fall.  In other words, while country 2 can benefit from improving productivity of its 
comparative disadvantage industry, this strategy will hurt country 1 and may invite retaliation.   
What strategy should country 2 adopt so that it can benefit from growth without inflicting losses on 
its trading partner?   Our model suggests that a good strategy is to pursue balanced growth, that is, 
to improve productivity in both its comparative advantage industry (the Y industry) and comparative 
disadvantage industry (the X industry).  In particular, refer to the equilibrium utility functions for 
structure (X)X(XY)Y in Table 3.  If  2x a  and  2y a  increase, the conditions for structure (X)X(XY)Y to 
occur in equilibrium still hold.  Moreover, in the new equilibrium, country 1’s per capita real income 
will not change if  22 / x y aa  remains constant, whereas country 2’s per capita real income will 
increase even if  22 / x y aa  remains constant as long as  2y a  increases.  This means that, starting 
from an equilibrium structure of (X)X(XY)Y, if country 2 improves productivity in both industries by 
the same proportion so that  22 / x y aa  remain constant, then the productivity growth will benefit 
country 2 without causing welfare losses in country 2.   
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we have developed a 2x2 Ricardian model with CES utility functions which 
demonstrates the possibility of immiserizing growth and defines the conditions under which it 
occurs.  Our model also suggests that a country may avoid immiserizing growth by developing its 
comparative disadvantage industry.  However developing a country’s comparative disadvantage 
industry alone may hurt the country’s trading partner; a more sustainable growth strategy that 
benefits the growing country without causing losses of its trading partner would be to pursue 
balanced growth in both the country’s comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage 
industries.   
 
There are some caveats of the model that should be noted.  Firstly, the model focuses on one 
country’s strategy to gain for its own productivity growth.  A nationally optimal strategy may not be 
globally optimal.    Secondly, since productivity growth is exogenous in our model, the model does 
not consider the source of growth.  Thirdly, while recognising that country 2’s growth strategy may 
invite retaliation if hurts country 1, the model takes the parameters relating to country 1 as given, 
thus does not explicitly model country 1’s reactions to country 2’s growth strategy.    These caveats 
point to possible areas of further research.   The contribution of this paper is limited to that it 
models the conditions for immiserizing growth and suggesting a sustainable strategy to avoid it. 
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